Post-Quantum Signatures: Why the Internet Is Catching Up
Summary
Pixel’s announcement explores the shift to post-quantum security: browsers and other software have adopted hybrid X25519MLKEM768 key exchange, while quantum-safe signatures are only beginning to ship. It explains why signatures lagged, including ML-DSA’s larger keys and signatures, and why the change matters for certificates, tokens, passkeys, and software updates.
DEV Community
Your browser went quantum-safe two years ago. Your signatures are only now catching up
Your browser went quantum-safe two years ago. Your signatures are only now catching up Open any major website in a current browser and look at the handshake. There is a good chance the session key was agreed with X25519MLKEM768: a classical elliptic-curve exchange running next to ML-KEM-768, the lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism NIST standardized in FIPS 203. Nobody announced it with a banner. Chrome, Firefox, OpenSSL and OpenSSH just turned it on, and the internet kept working. That was the first half of the post-quantum migration, and it moved first for a simple reason. Key exchange is the part an attacker can exploit retroactively. Record encrypted traffic today, store it, and decrypt it years from now when a large enough quantum computer exists. That is the harvest now, decrypt later threat, and it is the reason NIST's final transition report, IR 8547, published on October 27, 2026, treats key exchange as the urgent half. The second half is signatures, and it is only now starting to ship in real software. Why signatures lagged behind A signature does a different job from a key exchange. It proves that a certificate, a token, a login, a passkey assertion or a software update really came from who it claims to come from. A forgery is only useful while the verifier still trusts the key, so there is no harvest now, decrypt later pressure on signatures. Nobody rushes to replace something that only breaks in the future. The real blocker was size. An Ed25519 signature is 64 bytes. An ML-DSA-65 signature is about 3.3 kilobytes, and its public key is close to 2 kilobytes. Put that in every certificate in a TLS chain, every JSON Web Token, every passkey assertion, and everything gets fat. Handshakes grow, tokens grow, and the protocols that carry them were never designed for signatures that big. That is why, two years after NIST finalized ML-DSA in FIPS 204, no browser-trusted certificate authority issues ML-DSA certificates yet, and no browser accepts one. The standards exist: RFC 9881, published in October 2025, defines ML-DSA in X.509 certificates, and RFC 9935, from March 2026, does the same for ML-KEM keys. The plumbing is there. The public trust part is not. What actually shipped this month On November 3, authentik, the open source identity provider, shipped version 2026.11, and it is the clearest example I have seen of the signature half moving from roadmap to release. It adds ML-DSA in three places: First, certificates. It can generate and store ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 certificates next to the RSA, ECDSA and Ed25519 ones it already supports. These are for the parts you control: TLS between your own components, mutual TLS against a private certificate authority, and RADIUS with EAP-TLS 1.3. They are explicitly not for your public login page, because public CAs and browsers do not accept them yet. Second, OIDC tokens. OAuth2 providers can now sign ID tokens, access tokens and client assertions with an ML-DSA certificate, and the proxy outposts verify ML-DSA signed tokens from upstream identity providers. This is the part that puts actual logins onto post-quantum signatures. The honest catch, which authentik states plainly: applications that validate tokens themselves need a JWT library that understands ML-DSA before you switch a provider over. Check that first. Third, passkeys. WebAuthn registration and login accept ML-DSA credentials. No shipping authenticator supports ML-DSA yet, and some browsers error if you suggest an algorithm they do not know, so authentik puts ML-DSA at the bottom of the accepted list. Only an authenticator that offers nothing else will use it. That sounds useless until you think about it the other way: the support is in place and tested before the hardware shows up, instead of after. The same release raises the default symmetric encryption for SAML to AES-256-GCM. AES-128 is not broken by a quantum computer, but Grover's algorithm eats into its safety margin, and the NSA's CNSA 2...

Powered by Readybot.io